Researchers want to answer three basic questions: (d) Is an observed effect real or should it be attzibuted to chance? (b) If the effect is real, how large is it? and (c) Is the effect large enough to be useful? The first question concerning whether chance is a viable explanation for an observed effect is usually addressed with a null hypothesis significance test. A null hypothesis significance test tells us the probability of obtaining the effect or a more extreme effect if the null hypothesis is true. A significance test does not tell us how large the effect is or whether the effect is important or useful. Unfortunately, all too often the primary focus of research is on rejecting a null hypothesis and obtaining a small p value. The focus should be on what the data tell us about the phenomenon under investigation. This is not a new idea. Critics of significance testing have been saying it for years. For example, Frank Yates (1951). a contemporary of Ronald Fisher, observed that the use of the null hypothesis significance test has caused scientific research workers to pay undue attention to the results of the tests of significance they pe1form on their data, and too little to the estimates of the magnitude of the effects they are investigating .... The emphasis on tests of significance, and the consideration of the results of each experiment in isolation, have had the unfortunate consequence that scientific workers have often regarded the execution of a test of significance on an experiment as the ultimate objective. (pp. 32-33) The view that an emphasis on null hypothesis significance tests detracts researchers from the main business of science-interpreting the outcome of research, theory development, and so on-is shared by many contemporary
researchers (Cohen, 1994; Dar, 1987; Kirk, 1996; Schmidt, 1996; Thompson, 1996; Tukey, 1991) .
I believe that science is best served when researchers focus on the size of effects and their practical significance. Questions regarding the size of effects are addressed with descriptive statistics and confidence intervals. It is hard to understand why researchers have been so reluctant to embrace confidence intervals. A conficience interval contains all the information provided by a significance test, and in addition provides a range of values within which the effect parameter is likely to lie. A confidence interval is just as useful as a null hypothesis significance test for deciding whether chance or sampling variability is an unlikely explanation for an observed effect. Unlike a test statistic for, say, a contrast among means, a point estimate and confidence interval use the same unit of measurement as the data. This facilitates the interpretation of results and makes trivial effects harder to ignore.
One of the appeals of null hypothesis significance testing is that it is considered to be an objective, scientific procedure for advancing knowledge. On the other hand, deciding whether effects are useful or practically significant involves an element of subjectivity. The judgment is influenced by a variety of considerations, including the researcher's value system, societal concerns, assessment of costs and benefits, and so on. However, I believe that researchers have an obligation to make this kind of judgment. No one is in a better position than the researcher who collected and analyzed the data to decide whether the effects are trivial or not. It is a curious anomaly that researchers are tmsted to make a variety of complex decisions in the design and execution of an expeziment, but in the name of objectivity they are not expected to nor even encouraged to decide whether the effects are practically significant. Unfoztunately, there are no statistics that directly measure the practical significance of effect~. When the unit of measurement is familiar, such as the IQ scale, a point estimate of a difference and confidence interval can be used to decide whether effects are trivial, useful, or important. For unfamiliar scales, standardized measures of effect magnitude (effect size and strength of association) and confidence intervals for effect magnitude can help researchers decide whether results are practically significant.
The idea that significance tests tell us only part of the story and need to be supplemented was originally touched on by Karl Pearson in 1901 and more explicitly in 1925 by Ronald Fisher. Fisher (1925) proposed that researchers supplement the significance test in analysis of variance with the correlation ratio or eta, which measures the strength of the association between the independent and dependent variables. Since then, quantitative psychologists have proposed a variety of supplementary measures. I have identified 40 measures of effect magnitude that have been proposed to help researchers assess the practical significance of effects (Kirk, 1996) . Considerable progress has been made in developing unbiased estimators of effect magnitudes and associated confidence intervals; see, for example, Fleishman ( 1980 ), Fowler ( 1985 , and Hedges and Olkin (1985) .
The Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association encourages authors to provide effect -size infonnation (Ameli can Psychological Association [APA], 1994, p. 18) . Are authors following this advice? To answer this question, the 1995 volumes of four APA journals were examined (Kirk, 1996) . The results of the examination were very disappointing. The percentage of articles that contained a measure of effect magnitude (standardized effect size or strength of association) ranged from 12% for the Thompson & Snyder, 1997 , 1998 . Many reasons can be given for the widespread failure to report measures of effect magnitude. A major reason is a misunderstanding of what significance tests and p values tell us. Nickerson (2000) provided an excellent summary of conunon misconceptions. Two misconceptions are especially relevant: the belief that a small value of p means a treatment effect of large magnitude, and the belief that statistical significance means theoretical or practical significance (Nickerson, 2000) . Why do such misconceptions persist? Null hypothesis significance testing is a complicated ritual that is difficult to understand and teach. Each semester, I watch the puzzled expressions on the faces of my sophomore students as I explain that researchers test a null hypothesis that they believe is false in the hope of rejecting it and thereby making tenable the alternative hypothesis that they believe is true. Convoluted? Yes, but it can be taught.
Promoting the repmting of measures of effect magnitude is impottant, but that is only part of a much larger issue of promoting good statistical practices. The misconceptions about null hypothesis significance testing summatized by Nickerson (2000) raise setious questions about the quality of the quantitative methodology courses offered in our graduate programs. The declining emphasis on quantitative methodology in graduate programs documented by --2!6 EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT Aiken, West, Sechrest, and Reno ( 1990) contributes to the kinds of misconceptions cited by Nickerson (2000) . As an author of five statistics textbooks, I am well aware of the pressure from publishers and potential adopters to dumb down the presentation of statistics and place greater reliance on statistical software packages. I remember the resistance I encountered from reviewers ·and the publisher 23 years ago when I devoted an entire chapter to confidence intervals in IntroductOJy Statistics (Kirk, 1978) . Time has proved me tight. For example, my Statistics: An Introduction was praised for its thorough coverage of confidence intervals and measures of effect magnitude (Kirk, 1999) .
What can be done to promote good statistical practices? I believe that a multifaceted approach is necessary, one involving textbook authors, teachers of quantitative courses, faculty who shape undergraduate and graduate curticula, authors of statistical software packages, journal editors, and publication manuals. Textbook authors have a responsibility to lead the way by presenting the best practices in statistics and research methodology. Textbooks must present statistical concepts conectly, and teachers must be prepared to teach the concepts concctly. I remember an era when statistics courses were routinely assigned to the newest hire, regardless of his or her qualifications. Faculties who shape undergraduate and graduate cumcula also bear a major responsibility for the present state of training in statistics, methodology, and measurement courses. In 1990, Aiken et al. (1990) observed that the statistical and methodological curriculum has advanced little in 20 years; measurement has experienced a substantial decline. Typical first-year courses serve well only those students who undertake traditional laboratory research .... New PhDs are judged to be competent to handle traditional techniques, but not newer and often more useful procedures in their own research. (p. 721) A recent survey of statistical training in undergraduate psychology programs by Ftiedrich, Buday, and Kerr (2000) presented a similar disquieting picture.
Taken as a whole, our results suggest that statistical instruction for undergraduate psychology majors continues to emphasize traditional approaches to analysis with relatively minimal change in response to themes and advances in the field. In some respects, it appears to lag behind the advances in textbooks that are available and often used in such courses .... One of the most notable deficiencies is in the coverage of confidence intervals, an area that would hardly qualify as a recent advance. Journal editors are the gatekeepers for what appears in our scientific journals. They must be knowledgeable about good statistical practices and make authors adhere to those practices. I do not favor rigid mandates that either preclude or require the use of a pmticular procedure. I applaud the sensible approach taken by Murphy ( 1997) , editor of the Journal of Applied Psychology.
If an author decides not to present an effect size estimate along with the outcome of a significance test, I will ask the author to provide specific justification for why effect sizes are not reported. So far, I have not heard a good argument against presenting effect sizes. Therefore, unless there is a real impediment to doing so, you should routinely include effect size information in the pape. The next edition of the APA publication manual should contain a greatly expaneled version of the Task Force's recommendations. However, it is important not to fall into the trap of mandating the use of patticular procedures. Seventy-five years of null hypothesis testing has taught us the folly of blindly adhering to a ritualized procedure. If the next edition of the APA publication manual provides detailed guidance about good statistical practices, it will set off a chain reaction. Joumal editors will require authors to defend deviations from those practices; teachers of statistics, methodology, and measurement courses will change their courses; textbook authors will revise their books; authors of statistical packages will simplify the task of adhering to good practices; and faculties will require students to Jearn the full arsenal of quantitative and qualitative statistical tools.
